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Australia’s Equity Home Bias and Real Exchange Rate Volatility 
 
1 Introduction 
Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) state that the domestic ownership share of the world’s 
eight major stock markets: US (98 %), Japan (86.7 %), UK (78.5 %), Germany (75.4 
%), France (64.4 %), Italy (91.0%), Spain (94.2%) and Sweden (100.0%). The share of 
domestic equities in the world market portfolio for these eight stock markets is: US 
(36.4 %), Japan (43.7 %), UK (10.3  %), Germany (3.2 %), France (2.6 %), Italy (1.9 
%), Spain (1.1 %) and Sweden (0.8 %). This is contrary to the traditional international 
capital asset pricing model (ICAPM) which predicts that an investor should hold 
equities from a country as per that country’s share of world market capitalisation 
(Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965)). This phenomenon is termed as “home bias”. 
Mishra (2008) state that in the year 2005, United States actual share in Australia’s 
equity portfolio is 11.076 %, whereas the ICAPM benchmark percentage is 32.836 %.  
 
The empirical investigation into the home bias puzzle is important for several reasons.  
First, one of the major problems in the research on home bias has been the relatively 
poor quality of data on cross-border holdings. In previous studies (Cooper & Kaplanis 
1994; Tesar & Werner 1995; Bekaert & Harvey 2000), the cross-border holdings were 
estimated using accumulated capital flows and valuation adjustments. Warnock and 
Cleaver (2003) show that capital flows data are ill suited to estimate bilateral holdings 
because capital flows data track the flow of money between countries and the foreign 
country identified in flows data is that of transactor or intermediary, not the issuer of 
security. Capital flows data will produce incorrect estimate when intermediary and 
issuer countries differ. In 1993, the IMF Committee on Balance of Payments decided 
to promote an idea for an internationally coordinated benchmark survey of long term 
portfolio investment holdings so that the countries undertaking the benchmark survey 
of holdings would be in a position to obtain a reasonable estimate of the outstanding 
balances, at market price, of the level of portfolio investment held by their residents, 
rather than merely summing the balance of payments flows. The reasonable estimate 
thus obtained, would reduce, to some extent, the imbalance at the global level. In 1997, 
the IMF conducted the first coordinated portfolio investment survey (CPIS) in which 
29 countries participated; the next survey was conducted in 2001 in which 68 countries 
participated; and at the end of 2002 (68), 2003 (70), 2004 (74) and 2005 (74) countries 
participated. CPIS reports (in US currency) data on foreign portfolio asset holdings 
(divided into equity, long term debt, and short term debt) by the residence of the issuer. 
This paper contributes to the existing literature by employing the International 
Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) dataset on 
bilateral equity holdings for the years 2001 to 2006.  
 
Second, the existing literature on home bias focuses on the role of information 
asymmetries, transaction costs, the role of institutions, the role of non-tradable to 
hedge idiosyncratic risk, and behavioural finance. The literature on the role of 
exchange rate volatility as a potential source of home bias is sparse. There is only one 
systematic study by Fidora et al. (2007) which focuses on the role of exchange rate 
volatility as a driver of portfolio home bias and also explains differences in home bias 
across financial assets (i.e. equity and bond). They employ CPIS data as annual 
averages over the period 1997, 2001 to 2003 for 40 investor countries including all 
major industrialized and emerging economies and up to 120 host countries. There is no 
study which focuses on the role of exchange rate volatility for single source country. 
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The current paper contributes to the literature on exchange rate volatility and home 
bias by employing a Markowitz type international capital asset pricing model which 
incorporates real exchange rate volatility as stochastic deviations from purchasing 
power parity (PPP) to investigate the role of exchange rate volatility on Australia’s 
equity home bias over the years 2001 to 2006. Real exchange rate volatility induces a 
bias towards domestic financial assets because it puts additional risk on holding 
foreign securities from a domestic currency investors’ perspective, unless foreign local 
currency real returns and the real exchange rate are sufficiently negatively correlated. 
The empirical estimator includes source and host country-fixed effects, as these are 
able to control for nearly all country - specific determinants of home bias. The paper 
also conducts robustness tests: generalised method of moments by employing 
instrumental variables that are standard in the financial economics literature. 
 
Third, global financial integration is increasing. The uncertainty and risk that may arise 
due to exchange rate volatility may explain an important part of the pattern of global 
financial integration, which may also have an economic policy implication.  
 
This paper provides answers to the following: What is the effect of real exchange rate 
volatility on Australia’s equity home bias, in the presence of various control measures 
and robustness tests? Results indicate that real exchange rate volatility is a key 
determinant of float equity home bias, in the presence of various gravity type control 
measures and generalised method of moments, robustness tests.  
 
The results have some implications for economic policy. Real exchange rate volatility 
is an important factor that should be included in home bias and international financial 
integration models. Exchange rate volatility introduces a macroeconomic policy 
dimension into international financial integration and plays an important role along 
with information costs, transaction costs and governance. Real exchange rate volatility 
should be taken into account in the formulation of financial integration, home bias, 
macroeconomic and monetary stability policy models.     
 
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a literature review of the home 
bias puzzle. Section 3 illustrates stylised facts of Australia’s equity home bias. Section 
4 discusses the theoretical framework, empirical specification and instrumental 
variables. Section 5 describes the sources of global equity home bias, including real 
exchange rate volatility, familiarity and diversification. Section 6 describes the 
empirical results and, finally, section 7 provides a conclusion. 
 
2 Literature Review 
The literature on home bias revolves around different motives of investors, including 
explicit barriers to international investment, hedging motives, information asymmetries 
and behavioural biases. Uppal (1992), Lewis (1999) and Karoyli and Stulz (2003) 
provide excellent reviews of the home bias literature. Black (1974) outlines models of 
capital market equilibrium when there are explicit barriers to international investment 
in the form of a tax on net value of holdings of assets in one country by residents of 
another country. Stulz (1981a) develops a simple model in which it is costly for 
domestic investors to hold foreign assets. Cooper and Kaplanis (1986) derive efficient 
portfolios in a world where there are barriers to cross border investment, which depend 
both on the domicile of the investor and his country of investment.  
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Solnik (1974) presents an equilibrium model of the international capital market with 
the hypothesis that security price behaviour is consistent with a single world market 
concept. Adler and Dumas (1983) state that should there be zero inflation, investors 
can hedge foreign exchange risks through money market positions, therefore, in 
principle, foreign exchange risks do not affect equity portfolios. Stulz (1981b) 
constructs an intertemporal model of international asset pricing which incorporates 
differences in consumption opportunity sets across countries. He states that the real 
expected excess return on a risky asset is proportional to the covariance of the return of 
that asset with changes in the world real consumption rate. Pesenti and Wincoop 
(2002) investigate the extent to which nontradables (consumption and leisure) can 
affect the portfolio allocation decision in integrated capital markets. They find that 
hedging against nontradables shocks can account for only a small portfolio bias 
towards domestic assets. Their results suggest that in the near future they can expect to 
observe sizable additional international diversification. Baxter and Jermann (1997) 
state that despite the growing integration of international financial markets, investors 
do not diversify internationally to any significant extent. They find that the growth 
rates of labour and capital income are not highly correlated within four OECD 
countries (Japan, Germany, UK and US); however the returns to human capital and 
physical capital are very highly correlated within these countries. Hedging human 
capital risk involves a substantial short position in domestic marketable assets. A 
diversified world portfolio will involve a negative position in domestic marketable 
assets. 
  
Investors have different expectations about stock returns, volatilities and covariance. 
Gehrig (1993) develops a noisy rational expectations model where, even in 
equilibrium, investors remain incompletely informed. He shows that the domestic bias 
arises when investors are on average better informed about domestic stocks. Hasan and 
Simaan (2000) develop a model that incorporates both the foregone gains from 
diversification and the informational constraints of international investing. They 
examine 11 international markets’ returns over the last 25 years, from the perspective 
of German, Japanese and US investors. They show that home bias is consistent with 
rational mean variance portfolio choice. They prove that the nature of estimation risk 
in international markets can be responsible for this phenomenon. They show that when 
the cross market variability in the estimation errors of international markets’ means far 
exceeds the cross market variability in the means themselves, domestic dedication 
dominates international diversification. Jeske (2001) raises the awareness of a number 
of empirical and theoretical issues concerning home bias in equity holdings. He states 
that US has the lowest home bias among all industrialized nations, contrary to people’s 
belief that home bias in US is more severe than in other countries. Campbell and 
Kraussl (2007) empirically investigate the international equity allocation for the 
downside risk investor using nine international markets’ returns over the last 34 years 
and their results hold for both daily and monthly data and also from an international 
perspective. They state that due to greater downside risk, investors may think globally, 
but instead act locally. Their model’s results provide an alternative view of the home 
bias puzzle. Baele et al. (2007) investigates to what extent ongoing integration has 
eroded the equity home bias. To measure home bias, they compare observed foreign 
asset holdings of 25 markets with optimal weights obtained from five benchmark 
models. They find that for many countries, home bias decreases sharply at the end of 
the 1990s, a development they link to time varying globalization and regional 
integration.   
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Several research papers use survey data for behavioural explanation of the home bias. 
Suh (2005) studies the home bias pattern in international portfolio recommended by 
global financial institutions. He finds that the institutions tilt recommendations towards 
their home markets; they change home market weights more frequently relative to 
other market weights or relative to institutions from other countries; and they change 
weights of geographically distant markets less often than other weights. He states that 
home bias can arise from unobservable factors such as information asymmetry and 
investor optimism. Strong and Xu (2003) use survey data of fund managers’ views on 
prospects for international equity markets to shed light on why investment portfolios 
are significantly biased towards domestic equities. They find that fund managers from 
the US, the UK, continental Europe and Japan show a significant relative optimism 
towards their home equity market. Their evidence lends support to behavioural 
explanations of the bias.  
 
Several research papers have considered the effect of indirect barriers, such as 
information asymmetries, on equity investment and home bias. Merton (1987) 
develops a model where investors hold stocks that they know. In this model, investors 
believe that the risk of stocks they do not know is extremely high. Accordingly, the 
investors may overweight domestic stocks. French and Poterba (1991) use a simple 
model of investor preferences and behaviour to show that investors in each nation 
expect returns in their domestic equity market to be several hundred basis points higher 
than returns in other markets. The lack of diversification appears to be the result of 
investor choices, rather than institutional constraints. Tesar and Werner (1995) states 
that first, there is a strong evidence of a home bias in national investment portfolios 
despite the potential gains from international diversification. Second, the composition 
of the portfolio of foreign securities seems to reflect factors other than diversification 
of risk. Third, the high volume of cross border capital flows and the high turnover rate 
on foreign equity investments relative to turnover on domestic equity markets suggests 
that variable transactions costs are an unlikely explanation for home bias. Coval and 
Moskowitz (1999) state that portfolios of domestic stocks exhibit a preference of 
investing close to home. U.S. investment managers exhibit a strong preference for 
locally headquartered firms, particularly small, highly levered firms that produce 
nontraded goods. These results suggest that asymmetric information between local and 
nonlocal investors may drive preference for geographically close investments. Coval 
and Moskowitz (2001) state that fund managers earn substantial abnormal returns in 
nearby investments. Their results suggest that investors trade local securities at an 
informational advantage. Huberman (2001) states that shareholders of a Regional Bell 
Operating Company (RBOC) tend to live in the area which it serves, and an RBOC’s 
customers tend to hold its shares rather than other RBOCs’ equity. The geographical 
bias of the RBOC investors is closely related to the general tendency of households’ 
portfolios to be concentrated, of employees’ tendency to own their employers’ stocks 
in their retirement accounts, and to the home country bias in the international arena. 
People invest in the familiar while often ignoring the principles of portfolio theory. 
Using data on the investments a large number of individual investors made through a 
discount broker from 1991 to 1996, Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005) find that 
households exhibit a strong preference for local investments. They state that the 
average household generates an additional annualized return of 3.2% from its local 
holdings relative to its nonlocal holdings, suggesting that local investors can exploit 
local knowledge. Portes et al. (2001) use a gravity model to explain international 
transactions in financial assets and find that information asymmetries are responsible 
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for the strong negative relationship between asset trade (corporate equities, corporate 
bonds, and government bonds) and distance. Amadi (2004) states that there has been a 
distinct reduction in equity home bias in recent years. He examines if any of the 
prominent theoretical explanations or recent developments such as free trade and 
globalization, the advent of internet, and the rise of emerging markets and mutual fund 
investment have affected the increase in foreign diversification. He states that the rise 
of the internet and mutual fund investment has affected changes in foreign 
diversification, supporting information asymmetries explanation. Li et al. (2004) 
employ CPIS dataset to investigate the determinants of international portfolio holdings 
in a wide range of countries. They find that by explicit introducing information and 
transaction costs into their consumption based asset pricing model, the heterogeneity of 
cross border holdings and home bias puzzle can be explained. Portes and Rey (2005) 
explore a new panel data set on bilateral cross-border equity flows between 14 
countries, for a period from 1989 to 1996. Gross transaction flows depend on market 
size in source and destination country as well as trading costs, in which both 
information and the transaction technology play a role. They find that the geography of 
information is the main determinant of the pattern of international transactions, while 
there is weak support for diversification motive, in their data, once they control for the 
information friction. Chan et al. (2005) examine how mutual funds from 26 developed 
and developing countries allocate their investment between domestic and foreign 
equity markets and what factors determine their asset allocation worldwide. They find 
robust evidence that these funds, in aggregate, allocate a disproportionately larger 
fraction of investment to domestic stocks. They state that the stock market 
development and familiarity variables have significant, but asymmetric, effects on the 
domestic bias and foreign bias and that economic development, capital controls, and 
withholding tax variables have significant effects only on the foreign bias.  
A number of papers investigate bias in equity investments related specifically to 
individual countries. For Australia, Mishra (2008) explores the determinants of 
Australia’s equity home bias by employing CPIS dataset (2001 to 2005) on cross 
border equity investment. The paper finds that the share of the number of firms listed 
in the domestic market and the share of internet users in the total population of the host 
country has a significant impact on equity home bias. Trade linkages are found to have 
a mixed impact on equity home bias. The paper also finds that the country’s market 
share of the world market capitalisation and transaction costs do not impact Australia’s 
equity home bias. Mishra (2007) examines the bilateral, source and host factors driving 
portfolio equity investment across a set of countries using CPIS data. He states that the 
bilateral equity investment is strongly correlated with the underlying patterns of trade 
in goods and services. The information asymmetries and cultural-institutional 
proximity are important for bilateral equity investment. Mishra and Daly (2006) 
analyse the geography of Australia’s international portfolio investment using CPIS 
dataset. For United States, Salehizadeh (2003) use daily data covering the period of 
January 31, 1995 to May 31, 2001 to examine whether U.S. multinationals are the 
reason for the home bias puzzle. They subject a portfolio based on dollar returns of 47 
U.S. multinationals, as well as a base portfolio represented by the broad S&P 500 
index to correlation tests vis-a-vis non-U.S. stock indices. They find that U.S. 
multinational companies are not the reason for the continued existence of the home 
bias puzzle. Ahearne et al. (2004) test the home bias puzzle by employing high quality 
data on US holdings of foreign equities and quantitative measures of barriers to 
international investment. They find that the effects of direct barriers to international 
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investment, when statistically significant, are not economically meaningful. The 
portion of a country’s market that has a public US listing is a major determinant of a 
country’s weight in US investors’ portfolios. Cai and Warnock (2004) analyse 
foreigners’ and domestic institutional investors’ positions in US equities. They find a 
common preference for large firms and firms that are diversified internationally. Using 
an international factor model, they show that exposure to foreign equity markets is 
greater for domestic firms that are more diversified internationally, suggesting that 
some of the home grown foreign exposure translates into international benefits. They 
state that after accounting for home grown foreign exposure, the share of foreign 
equities in investors’ portfolios nearly doubles, reducing the observed home bias. For 
Chile, Holland and Warnock (2003) state that high growth, liquid Chilean firms have 
greater relative weights in US equity portfolios, but the most important determinant of 
a firm’s portfolio weight is whether it is listed on a US exchange. Firms appear to be 
able to access international capital at the time of the cross listing, but this access may 
be short lived. For Japan, Hiraki et al (2005) examine how foreign and domestic 
portfolio investors, both classified into money managers, invest in Japanese firms over 
the sample period of 1985-1998. They state that the investment behaviour of money 
managers is more consistent with the agency familiarity explanation than the 
information based explanation regardless of their nationalities. Kang and Stulz (1997) 
find that foreign investors tend to underweight smaller and highly leveraged firms. 
Foreigners invest in large firms with large export sales and firms with which they are 
familiar. For Sweden, Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) characterize foreign ownership 
using dataset of ownership and attributes of Swedish firms. They find that foreign 
investors prefer large firms, firms that pay low dividends and firms with large cash 
positions on their balance sheets. They find an institutional investor bias rather than a 
foreign investor bias. Karlsson, A. and Norden, L. (2007) investigate differences in 
home bias on an individual levl by studying portfolios formed as a part of the new 
defined contribution pension plan in Sweden. They find that the likelihood of home 
bias is caused by both rational and irrational factors. They relate home bias to 
investors’ desire to hedge against inflation, sophistication and overconfidence. Using 
data from Finland, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) find that foreign investors tend to be 
momentum investors, buying past winning stocks and selling past losers. Domestic 
investors, particularly households, tend to be contrarians. Grinblatt and Keloharju 
(2001) state that investors are more likely to hold, buy, and sell the stocks of Finnish 
firms that are located close to the investor, that communicate in the investor’s native 
tongue, and that have chief executives of the same cultural background. Liljeblom and 
Loflund (2005) investigate the determinants of foreign portfolio investment flows into 
the Finnish stock market. Using company specific data on the degree of foreign 
ownership, they report that foreign investment flows are significantly related to 
investment barriers as proxied by dividend yield, liquidity, firm size and risk related 
variables. For Korea, Choe et al. (2001) use trade data from Korea from December 
1996 to November 1998 and find evidence that domestic individual investors have a 
short-lived private information advantage for individual stocks over foreign investors, 
but almost no evidence that domestic institutional investors have such an advantage. 
Kim and Wei (2002) use a unique data set to study the trading behavior of foreign 
portfolio investors in Korea before and during the currency crisis. They state that 
investors in different categories have different trading patterns. For example, foreign 
investors outside Korea are more likely to engage in positive feedback trading 
strategies and are more likely to engage in herding than the branches/subsidiaries of 
foreign institutions in Korea or foreign individuals living in Korea. This difference in 
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trading behavior is possibly related to the difference in their information. For 
Germany, Hau (2001) states that traders located outside Germany in non-German 
speaking cities show lower proprietary trading profit. He finds evidence for an 
information advantage due to corporate headquarters proximity for high frequency 
(intraday) trading. Lin and Shiu (2003) investigate foreign ownership in the Taiwan 
stock market from 1996 to 2000. Foreign investors appear to favour large firms and 
low book to market stocks. Foreign investors strongly prefer firms with high export 
ratios with which they are more familiar on account of their higher foreign sales. 
Foreign investors hold more shares of high beta stocks than of low beta stocks for 
small firms. Large firms have lower investment barriers than small firms. Dvorak 
(2005) use transaction data from the Jakarta stock exchange and find that domestic 
investors have information advantage over foreign investors. Foreign investors 
systematically buy at higher and sell at lower intra day prices. Foreign investors tend to 
sell prior to large positive returns. The permanent impact of foreign purchases is 
smaller than that of domestic purchases.  
There are some papers on corporate governance and home bias. Dahlquist et al. (2003) 
state that there is a close relation between corporate governance and the portfolios held 
by investors. They construct an estimate of the world portfolio of shares available to 
investors who are not controlling shareholders (the world float portfolio). The world 
float portfolio differs sharply from the world market portfolio. In regressions 
explaining the portfolio weights of U.S. investors, the world float portfolio has a 
positive significant coefficient but the world market portfolio has no additional 
explanatory power. They also analyse Swedish firm level data on foreign ownership 
and confirm the importance of the float portfolio as a determinant of these holdings. 
Gelos and Wei (2005) examine whether country transparency affects international 
portfolio investment. They construct new measures of transparency and use a unique 
microdata set on portfolio holdings of emerging market funds around the world. They 
distinguish between government and corporate transparency. They state that funds 
systematically invest less in less transparent countries and funds have a greater 
propensity to exit nontransparent countries during crises. Kho et al. (2006) find that the 
home bias of US investors decreased the most towards countries in which the 
ownership by corporate insiders is low, and countries in which ownership by corporate 
insiders fell. Using firm-level data for Korea, they find that portfolio equity investment 
by foreign investors in Korean firms is inversely related to insider ownership and that 
the firms that attract the most foreign portfolio equity investment are large firms with 
dispersed ownership.  
 
The literature on the role of real exchange rate volatility as a potential driver of home 
bias is sparse. Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) develop an indirect test of the impact of 
domestic inflation risk in the absence of purchasing power parity. Their test is based on 
an examination of the correlation between domestic equity returns and inflation, rather 
than an analysis of the impact of real exchange rate volatility on home bias. There is 
only one paper by Fidora et al. (2007) that investigates the role of exchange rate 
volatility on home bias and also explains differences in home bias across financial 
assets, i.e. equity and bond for 40 investor countries including all major industrialized 
and emerging market economies and upto 120 host countries. They employ CPIS data 
as annual averages over the period 1997, 2001 to 2003. They state that real exchange 
rate volatility induces a bias towards domestic financial assets as well as a stronger 
bias for assets with low local currency volatility.  
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3. Australia’s Float adjusted Home Bias Measure: Stylised Facts 
This paper employs Australia’s free float home bias measure from Mishra (2008): 
ijFFHB ,     =        ∗−
jFF
j
iFF
I
I
,
,1         (1) 
where  is the float adjusted measure of home bias,  is the float adjusted 
measure of country  equity holdings in country 
ijFFHB ,
j
iFFI ,
si′ j  and  is float adjusted world 
market portfolio of country  
∗
jFFI ,
j . 
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
Table 1 presents Australia’s float adjusted home bias measure as of December 2006. 
Column (1) of the table presents Australian investors’ actual portfolio share as of 
December 2006. The actual portfolio share is the foreign equity holdings of Australia 
in other countries relative to Australia’s total holdings of foreign and domestic equities. 
Column (1) indicates that Australia’s actual percent portfolio share is the highest in US 
(9.47) followed by Japan (1.59), UK (1.47), Netherlands (1.13) and then, the remaining 
countries of the world. Column (2) of the table presents the theoretical portfolio shares, 
i.e., share of country’s float market capitalisation in the world float market 
capitalisation. It shows the share of Australia’s equity holdings by country under the 
assumption that investors choose portfolios based on the standard portfolio theory. 
Column (3) compares the actual share of domestic equities held by Australians in other 
countries with the benchmark share in the world portfolio as per ICAPM model. This 
comparison gives an indication of the degree to which Australian investors’ 
underweight different foreign countries. Column (3) clearly indicates that there is a 
significant amount of variation in values across countries and Australian holdings are 
less than those predicted by ICAPM. The ratio is 0.35 for United States, indicating that 
Australian investors’ holding of stocks from United States at end-2006 was 35 percent 
of what traditional portfolio theory would have predicted. The degree of 
underweighting is more severe against countries like Argentina (0.003), where 
Australian investor holds 0.3 percent of the shares predicted by traditional ICAPM 
levels. Column (4) indicates the measure of home bias as per equation (9). Australian 
investors allocate 9.47 % of their portfolio in US, whereas 27.02 % of the world 
market capitalisation are abroad; they have only exploited international diversification 
to 35 % and thus have home bias of 65 %. A greater value of home bias measure 
corresponds to a lower weight in Australia relative to world portfolios and, thus, a 
higher degree of bias.  
[INSERT GRAPH 1] 
Graph 1 illustrates Australia’s equity home bias over the period from 2002 to 2006. 
Graph 1 shows some interesting trends in Australia’s equity home bias. Australia’s 
equity home bias rises from 0.58 (2002) to 0.66 (2004) and then decreases to 0.64 
(2006), in case of United States. Australia’s equity home bias rises from 0.59 (2002) to 
0.76 (2006), for United Kingdom. In case of New Zealand, Australia’s equity home 
bias decreases from 0.95 (2003) to 0.87 (2005). For Germany, equity home bias 
increases from 0.76 (2002) to 0.78 (2004) and then decreases to 0.71 (2006). 
Australia’s home bias decreases from 0.87 (2002) to 0.85 (2004) and then rises to 0.87 
(2005) and falls to 0.82 (2006). For Finland, Australia’s home bias increases from 0.86 
(2002) to 0.91 (2006). 
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4. Theoretical Framework, Empirical Specification and Instrumental Variables 
4.1 Theoretical Framework 
This paper employs a Markowitz type international capital asset pricing model which 
incorporates real exchange rate volatility as stochastic deviations from purchasing 
power parity (PPP), in accordance with Fidora et al. (2007). Real exchange rate 
volatility induces a bias towards domestic financial assets because it puts additional 
risk on holding foreign securities from a domestic currency investors’ perspective, 
unless foreign local currency real returns and the real exchange rate are sufficiently 
negatively correlated.  
 
The nominal (local currency) rate of return  and real (local currency) rate of return Dl
Dr  of a domestic asset are given by the following equations: 
DDD il εμ ++=          (2) 
DDD ilr −= Dεμ +=         (3) 
where, μ  is constant and  is an error term with Dε ( ) 0=DE ε  and Var ( ) 2σε =D  
 
η+−=Δ FD iieln          (4) 
where, is variation of the domestic currency, is the domestic inflation rate,  
is the foreign inflation rate, 
elnΔ Di Fi
η is an error term with ( ) 0=ηE and Var ( ) 2ηση =  
 The nominal (foreign currency) rate of return  and real (local currency) rate of 
return 
Fl
Fr  of a foreign asset are given by the following equations: 
 
FFF il εμ ++=          (5) 
ηεμ ++=−Δ+= FDFF ielr ln        (6) 
Equation (6) suggests that real return of foreign securities expressed in domestic 
currency depends on the shock to the return of the foreign security and on a shock 
measuring the deviation of the exchange rate from relative purchasing power parity, η . 
Any deviation of the exchange rate from purchasing power parity drives a wedge 
between real returns on domestic and foreign investment. 
 
The global capital market consists of two countries, each of which offers equity. 
Following equations (3) and (6): 
 
R=           (7) 
( )
( )⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
F
D
rE
rE
 
 This paper assumes that variances of nominal returns are identical and all errors are 
uncorrelated. The variance-covariance matrix of domestic currency real returns is 
given by: 
Σ =      (8) ( ) ( ) )⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+=
=
22
2
0
0
ησσ
σ
F
D
rVar
rVar
This paper follows Adler and Dumas (1983) and Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) and 
assumes a standard Markowitz mean-variance investor who maximizes a quadratic 
utility function, 
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( ) ( ''
2
max RVarREU )λ−=         (9) 
where,  ( )'RE  is the expected real return on a portfolio of risky assets, ( )'RVar  is the 
variance of returns and λ  is the coefficient of risk aversion. 
 
The investor chooses the optimal portfolio weights  for all individual assets in the 
portfolio, with respect to a vector of expected real returns 
w ( )RE  of the individual 
assets, variance-covariance matrix Σ  of real returns and a unity investment restriction. 
The resulting optimization problem is given by the following Lagrangian, 
( ) ( 1
2
max ''' −−Σ−= IwwwREwL μ )λ       (10) 
Derivation of equation (18) with respect to  yields the optimal portfolio weights: w
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where  A  is portfolio constant. 
Substituting (7), (8) and (12) in (11) yields portfolio weights of domestic equity and 
foreign equity as follows: 
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The world market portfolio  is defined as: *w
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where,  is the domestic fraction of world portfolio wealth, . DW DF WW −= 1
Substituting equation (13) into equation (14) yields the following expression of equity 
home bias, ( )( ) 22
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The above model gives rise to the following postulate which will be tested empirically: 
Home bias increases in real exchange rate volatility, which measures the degree to 
which relative purchasing power parity is violated. If the change in the real exchange 
rate volatility equals the inflation differential, i.e. relative purchasing power parity 
holds, home bias is zero. Conversely, as real exchange rate volatility increases to 
infinity, home bias converges to unity, which implies absence of foreign investment. 
 
4.2 Empirical Specification 
The primary goal is to investigate the effect of real exchange rate volatility on cross-
country differences in bilateral home bias. The preferred estimator includes source and 
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host country-fixed effects, as these are able to control for nearly all country specific 
determinants of home bias. The following model also includes different potential 
sources of home bias other than real exchange rate volatility. These sources of home 
bias are based on the literature of gravity models including distance, trade, language, 
legal origin, foreign listing, transaction cost, covariance and other proxies for 
information asymmetries. The objective is to test whether real exchange rate volatility 
continues to be a significant determinant of home bias even after controlling for these 
alternative hypotheses. This paper also empirically tests the following model and 
conducts generalised method of moments robustness tests by employing instrumental 
variables that are standard in financial economics literature.  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ij
ijFF
TAXTRANDISTRDFL
LOLANSIZECOVISLVOLHB
εααααα
ααααααα
+++++
+++++++=
1110987
6543210,   (16)                               
where : Float adjusted measure of home bias, VOL: standard deviation of 
monthly change of the difference of bilateral nominal exchange rate and bilateral 
inflation differential, 1995 to 2006, dummy which is equal to the number of 
island countries, COV : covariance of monthly returns between source country and 
host country, 1995 to 2006, : share of a country’s stock market in world market 
capitalisation,  dummy which is equal to 1 if host and source country share 
common language, otherwise it is zero,  dummy which is equal to 1 if host and 
source country share common legal origin, otherwise it is zero, : share of the 
number of foreign firms listed in total number of firms listed in domestic market, 
average of imports and exports normalised by the destination country’s GDP, 
logarithm of the distance between countries, TRAN : Transaction cost associated 
with share trading in destination country, : corporate tax rate of destination 
country,  
ijFFHB ,
:ISL
SIZE
:LAN
:LO
FL
:TRD
:DIS
TAX
ijε : random error term. 
 
4.3 Instrumental Variables 
This paper uses CPIS data on cross border equity holdings to calculate float equity 
home bias. The CPIS’s equity investment data is based on the concept of capital stock. 
Endogeneity should be less of a problem for capital stocks than flows. However, in 
order to address possible endogeneity problems, measurement errors and omitted 
variable bias, this paper adopts generalised method of moments techniques, by 
employing instrumental variables that are standard in the financial economics 
literature. This paper employs lag of real exchange rate volatility as an instrument.  
 
This paper considers the index of religion and ethnicity from Alesina et al. (2003) as an 
instrument, in accordance with Mishra and Daly (2007). In accordance with Li et al. 
(2004), this paper employs logarithm of the gross domestic product of host country 
 as instrument to return variables. The paper also uses the index of landlocked 
 from Rose (2005) as an instrument and product of natural logarithm of 
population of Australia and host country 
(GDP)
)(LCK
( )POP  as an instrument. This paper also 
employs data on the quality of domestic institutions from Kaufmann et al. (2007) as 
instrumental variables because quality of institutions is largely exogenous to bilateral 
capital stocks.  
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5. Sources of Home Bias  
Some of the possible sources of home bias in the Australian investor’s equity holdings 
may be due to exchange rate volatility, familiarity and investors’ diversification 
motives. These sources of home bias are discussed below. 
 
5.1 Exchange rate volatility ( )  VOL
Real exchange rate volatility induces a bias towards domestic financial assets because 
it puts additional risk on holding foreign securities from a domestic currency investors’ 
perspective, unless foreign local currency real returns and the real exchange rate are 
sufficiently negatively correlated. This paper takes the standard deviation of monthly 
real exchange rate changes over the period 1995 to 2006 as measure of exchange rate 
volatility. The data on exchange rates and consumer price index is from Data Stream. 
 
5.2 Familiarity 
Familiarity plays an important role in investors’ equity investment decisions (Mishra 
(2007; 2008), Mishra and Daly (2006), Portes and Rey (2005), Coval and Moskowitz 
(1999; 2001), Portes et al. (2001), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000, 2001) and Huberman 
(2001)). The following section discusses the familiarity control measures of home bias: 
foreign listing, trade, distance, transaction cost, language, legal origin, etc.  
 
(i) Size    ( )SIZE
SIZE  is country’s market share of the world market capitalisation. This variable tests 
the assumption of the traditional theory of ICAPM that investors should diversify 
according to their country’s share of world market capitalisation. If an investor’s 
domestic market’s share of world market capitalisation increases, then the investor 
would decrease the foreign investments. This measure is in accordance with Ahearne et 
al (2004) and Amadi (2004). The stock market data is from Standard and Poors (2007).    
 
(ii) Trade ( )  TRD
TRD is the average of imports and exports normalised by the destination country’s 
GDP. This measure is in accordance with Mishra (2008), Ahearne et al. (2004) and 
Amadi (2004). Investors may be inclined to hold securities of close trading partners for 
various reasons including hedging, familiarity with host country’s products or 
spillovers of information. Investors are better able to attain accounting and regulatory 
information on foreign markets through trade in goods. Mishra (2008) states that trade 
linkages are found to have a mixed impact on Australia’s equity home bias. This 
variable is expected to have a negative impact on the measure of home bias. The data 
on imports and exports is from IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics and GDP data is 
from World Bank’s World Development Indicators.     
 
(iii) Distance ( )  DIS
DIS  is the logarithm of the distance between capital city of source country and host 
country in kilometres. Geographical distance is a barrier to interaction among 
economic agents and cultural exchange. Countries which are relatively close 
geographically can also be expected to share cultural similarities, which tend to lower 
information costs. Li et al. (2004) estimate that if the distance between two countries 
doubles, the cross border equity holdings are reduced by 68%. This variable is 
expected to have a negative impact on foreign equity holdings. The data on distance is 
from http://www.indo.com/distance/. 
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(iv) Language  ( )LAN
LAN  is the common language dummy variable which is equal to one if source and 
host country share a common language; otherwise its value is zero. Investors prefer to 
invest in foreign countries that share a common language with their home country. 
Common language may better enable investors to read company financial reports and 
financial press analysis. This may enhance investors’ familiarity with destination 
countries financial system and thus reduce investors’ information costs. Data on 
language is from the World Factbook 2006 (www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/), 
which reports the official, major and unofficial languages from all over the world. This 
variable is expected to have a negative impact on the measure of home bias.  
 
(v) Legal Origin ( )  LO
Common origin to the legal system uses a dummy variable for similarity in institutions. 
This paper assigns a dummy value of 1 if the source and host country have the same 
legal origin, otherwise it is zero. Laws in different countries are typically not written 
from scratch, but rather transplanted from a few legal families or traditions. In general, 
commercial laws come from two broad traditions: common law, which is English in 
origin, and civil law, which derives from Roman law. The modern commercial laws 
originate from the three major families French, German and Scandinavian, in the civil 
law tradition. The three major law tradition families that have global impact are 
English common law and the French and German civil law. In case of individual 
countries, the resulting laws reflect both the influence of their families and country 
specific law characteristics. This variable is expected to have a negative impact on 
Australia’s equity home bias. The data on legal origin is from La Porta et al. (1998). 
 
(vi) Transaction Costs  ( )TRAN
Home bias can arise due to high transaction costs associated with trading foreign 
equities. The transaction cost data is derived from Elkins-McSherry Co. (www.elkins-
mcsherry.com). Elkins-McSherry Co. receives trade data on all global trades by 
institutional traders and computes measures of trading costs. The data consists of 
average trading costs as a percentage of trade value for active managers in a universe 
of 42 countries. The data are quarterly, from the last quarter of 1995 through to the 
fourth quarter of 2006, for 150 global institutions. The transaction cost comprises of 
three cost components, viz. commissions, fees and market impact costs. This paper 
takes into account the total cost comprising all three cost components for the end 
quarter of years 2001 to 2006. Investors would underweight high transaction cost 
countries in their portfolios and, accordingly, this variable is expected to have a 
positive impact on the measure of home bias. 
 
(vii) Foreign Listing  ( )FL
FL  is the share of the number of foreign firms listed in total number of firms listed in 
domestic market. This measure is in accordance with Mishra (2008) and Amadi 
(2004). When host countries firms list equity on source country’s stock exchanges or 
issue public debt in source country’s markets, barriers to source country’s investors are 
reduced. The listed securities have increased investor recognition; lower transaction 
costs and better settlement in source country. The listed firms are able to adopt the 
source country’s accounting standards, disclosure requirements and regulatory 
environment. Accordingly, the listed firms are able to produce higher quality financial 
information, which reduces information costs. This reduction in the information costs 
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makes the firm more attractive to source country’s investors. Local investors can 
readily access foreign equity of the listed foreign firms in their domestic markets. 
 
Baker et al. (2002) state that international firms that list their shares on the New York 
Stock Exchange or the London Stock Exchange experience a significant increase in 
visibility, as proxied by analyst coverage and print media attention. The increase in 
analyst following is also associated with a decrease in the cost of equity capital after 
the listing event. Sarkissian and Schill (2004) examine the market preferences of firms 
listing their stock abroad. They find that geographic, economic, cultural, and industrial 
proximity plays a dominant role in the selection of overseas listing stock exchange and 
cross listing activity is more common across markets for which diversification gains 
are relatively low. Ahearne et al. (2004) state that to publicly issue debt or list equity 
on US exchanges, a foreign firm must reconcile its accounts with US generally-
accepted accounting principles (GAAP), meet the security exchange’s stringent 
disclosure requirements, and subject itself to the associated regulatory burden. This 
allows investors to gather high quality financial information on companies at lower 
costs. The foreign countries whose firms do not alleviate information costs by opting 
into the US regulatory environment are more severely underweighted in US equity 
portfolios. Mishra (2008) finds that the share of the number of firms listed in the 
domestic market has a significant impact on Australia’s equity home bias. This 
variable is expected to have a negative impact on Australia’s equity home bias. The 
data on the number of foreign firms and total number of firms in domestic markets is 
from International Federation of Stock Exchanges.  
 
5.3 Islands ( )  ISL
This paper also employs familiarity control measure: islands ( )ISL  from Rose (2005). 
 is the number of island nations in the source and host country pair (0, 1 or 2).  ISL
 
5.4 Tax  ( )TAX
This paper employs a control measure of corporate tax from KPMG’s corporate tax 
survey. KPMG has published annual analysis of corporate tax rates at a global level, 
since 1993. KPMG reported corporate tax rates from 23 countries in the year 1993. In 
2006, KPMG has reported corporate tax rates from 86 countries.  
 
5.5 Diversification - Covariance ( )COV  
COV  is the covariance between returns of source and host country. This measure is in 
accordance with Mishra (2008). The covariance is a proxy for the diversification 
between two countries. The financial economics literature suggests that the greater the 
co-movements between financial assets of two countries, the lower the benefit of 
diversification. There is no rationale for an investor to invest in foreign assets in 
countries when their returns are strongly positively correlated with domestic financial 
assets, as this does not allow the investor to diversify his risk. When the correlation 
between source country and host country is small, source country investors enjoy a 
larger diversification gain from investing in the host country; they have a greater desire 
to increase their equity holdings in the host country. Therefore, the degree of 
Australia’s equity home bias for host country will be smaller. The covariance of 
returns between Australia and host country is computed using return data from 
DataStream’s Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI). The return data is 
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calculated from MSCI monthly stock market indices for months ranging from January 
1995 to December 2006.  
 
6. Empirical Results 
The empirical results are based on panel regression and generalised method of 
moments robustness tests using instrumental variables that are standard in the financial 
economics literature for the years 2001 to 2006. Appendix A lists the countries. 
[TABLE 2] 
Table 2 presents the correlation matrix for the variables used in the paper. The measure 
of home bias is negatively related to the share of a country’s stock market in world 
market capitalisation, language dummy, legal origin dummy, share of the number of 
foreign firms listed in the Australian stock market, distance, island dummy, tax  and 
positively related to real exchange rate volatility, covariance, transaction cost and 
trade. The covariance variable  is highly correlated (-0.56) with share of foreign 
firms listed in the domestic market variable
(COV )
( )FL . The distance variable (  is highly 
correlated (-0.84) trade variable .  
)DIS
( )TRD
[TABLE 3] 
Table 3 indicates the panel regression results and generalised method of moments 
regression test results of Australia’s home bias measure by regressing home bias 
variable against the independent variables, i.e., real exchange rate volatility, island 
dummy, covariance, size, language, legal origin and tax in various specifications.  
 
In column (1), real exchange rate volatility variable ( )VOL  is significant at 10 percent. 
The size variable  enters significantly at the 1 percent level with a negative sign. 
Home bias decreases in the relative value of a country’s portfolio. Large global players 
can afford a relatively large home weight without necessarily showing a home bias. 
Covariance variable (  is positive and significant at 1 percent. Covariance 
variable is used to test the diversification motive. If transactions occur because of 
diversification motive, the covariance variable should be significant because the 
greater the co-movement between financial assets of two countries, the lower the 
benefit of diversification. Covariance variable, though statistically significant, is 
economically insignificant suggesting low diversification motives of investors. The 
island dummy is negative and significant at 1 percent. The overall adjusted R2 is 0.29.  
(SZ )
)
)
COV
 
Column (2) presents generalized method of moments regression results to check the 
robustness of results in column (1). Real exchange rate volatility (  enters 
significantly at 5 percent with positive sign. The coefficient of real exchange rate 
volatility increases from 0.03 (using the non-instrumented variable) to 0.18 (using 
instrumented variable). Size variable 
VOL
( )SZ  is negative and significant, implying that 
home bias decreases as the relative weight of a country’s portfolio increases in the 
world market portfolio. Covariance variable ( )COV  is both economically and 
statistically insignificant, suggesting low diversification motives of investors. The 
island dummy is negative and significant at 1 percent.  
 
Column (3) presents regression results by employing tax variable ( )TAX  along with 
real exchange rate volatility ( , size )VOL ( )SZ , covariance ( )COV  and island dummy 
 independent variables. Real exchange rate volatility (ISL) ( )VOL  is positive but 
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insignificant. Tax variable (  is positive and insignificant. This is contrary to the 
view that destination countries that adopt low tax rates tend to attract more inward 
investment from the source country, Australia. The size variable 
)TAX
( )SZ  is significant at 
the 1 percent level with a negative sign, suggesting that home bias decreases as the 
relative weight of a country’s portfolio increases in the world market portfolio. The 
covariance variable  is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level. However, covariance variable is economically insignificant. This is in 
accordance with Mishra (2008) who states that Australian investors are found to 
exhibit low diversification motives. The island variable 
(COV )
( )ISL  is negative and 
significant at the 1 percent level.  
 
Column (4) presents generalized method of moments regression results to check the 
robustness of results in column (3). Real exchange rate volatility is positive and 
significant at 5 percent level. The coefficient of real exchange rate volatility increases 
from 0.02 (using the non-instrumented variable) to 0.14 (using instrumented variable). 
Tax variable  is statistically significant at 10 percent level; however, it is 
economically insignificant. This reinforces the view that corporate tax rate does not 
have a significant impact on Australia’s equity home bias. The size variable (  is 
negative and significant at the 1 percent level with the coefficient increasing from  
(TAX )
)SZ
-0.42 (column 3) to -0.49 (column 4). The covariance variable ( )COV  retains the same 
sign and significance level as in column (3). The island variable ( )ISL  is negative and 
significant at the 1 percent level.  
 
In column (5), real exchange rate volatility variable ( )VOL  is significant at 10 percent. 
The language (  dummy is negative and significant at 1 percent which implies 
that investors prefer investing in common language countries. Common language 
enables Australian investors to better understand the cultural, financial and regulatory 
environment of the host country, thus influencing Australian investors’ equity 
investment decisions. Covariance variable 
)LAN
( )COV  is positive and significant at 1 
percent. Covariance variable, though statistically significant, is economically 
insignificant suggesting low diversification motives of investors. The island dummy is 
negative and significant at 1 percent. The overall adjusted R2 is 0.24.  
 
Column (6) presents generalized method of moments regression results to check the 
robustness of results of column (3). Real exchange rate volatility (  enters 
significantly at 5 percent with positive sign. The coefficient of real exchange rate 
volatility increases from 0.03 (using the non-instrumented variable) to 0.13 (using 
instrumented variable). The language 
)VOL
( )LAN  dummy becomes insignificant. The 
covariance variable  variable looses significance from 1 percent to 5 percent. 
Further, the covariance variable 
(COV )
( )COV  is statistically insignificant, suggesting low 
diversification motives of investors. The island dummy is negative and significant at 1 
percent.  
 
Column (7) presents regression results by employing tax variable ( )TAX  along with 
real exchange rate volatility ( , language dummy )VOL ( )LAN , covariance  and 
island dummy  independent variables. Real exchange rate volatility (  is 
(COV )
) )(ISL VOL
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positive and significant at 10 percent level. Tax variable ( )TAX  is negative and 
insignificant. This is contrary to the view that the greater the corporate tax rate in 
destination countries, the higher the equity home bias in the source country, Australia. 
The language dummy , covariance variable (LAN ) ( )COV  and island dummy  
have the same sign, significance level and coefficient as those in column (5).  
( )ISL
 
Column (8) presents generalized method of moments regression results to check the 
robustness of results of column (7). The real exchange rate volatility variable ( )  is 
negative and insignificant. Tax variable 
VOL
( )TAX  is positive and statistically significant 
at 10 percent; however, it is economically insignificant. This reinforces the view that 
corporate tax rate in destination countries does not impact Australia’s equity 
investment. The covariance variable ( )COV  retains the same sign, significance and 
coefficient as in column (7). The language variable ( )LAN  is negative and statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level. The coefficient of language ( )LAN  increases from  
-0.06 (column 7) to -0.14 (column 8). The island dummy ( )ISL  is negative and 
statistically at 5 percent level. 
 
In column (9), real exchange rate volatility variable ( )VOL  is significant at 10 percent. 
The legal origin variable  is negative and significant at 10 percent, which implies 
that Australian investors are better able to understand the legal and regulatory 
environment of the host countries which have the same legal origin as their own and 
accordingly prefer to invest in those countries. The size variable (  enters 
significantly at the 1 percent level with a negative sign. Covariance variable ( ) is 
positive and significant at 1 percent. Covariance variable is statistically significant; 
however it is economically insignificant suggesting low diversification motives of 
investors. The island dummy is negative and significant at 1 percent. The overall 
adjusted R2 is 0.31.  
(LO)
)
)
SZ
COV
 
Column (10) presents generalized method of moments regression results to check the 
robustness of results in column (5). Real exchange rate volatility (  enters 
significantly at 5 percent with positive sign. The coefficient of real exchange rate 
volatility increases from 0.03 (using the non-instrumented variable) to 0.17 (using 
instrumented variable). The legal origin variable 
VOL
( )LO  is negative and insignificant. 
Size variable (  is negative and insignificant. Covariance variable  is 
statistically significant at 10 percent; however it is economically insignificant. The 
island dummy is negative and significant at 1 percent.  
)SZ ( )COV
 
Column (11) presents regression results by employing tax variable ( )TAX  along with 
real exchange rate volatility , legal origin dummy (VOL) ( )LO , covariance , 
size  and island dummy (  independent variables. Real exchange rate volatility 
 is positive and significant at 10 percent level. Tax variable 
( )COV
(SZ ) )
)
ISL
(VOL ( )TAX  is negative 
and insignificant. This reinforces the view that corporate tax rate in destination 
countries does not impact Australia’s equity investment. The size variable (  is 
negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The covariance variable 
 is statistically significant at 1 percent; however, it is economically 
)
)
SZ
(COV
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insignificant. The legal origin dummy ( )LO  is economically and statistically 
insignificant. The island dummy ( )ISL  is negative and statistically significant at the 1 
percent level.   
 
Column (12) presents generalized method of moments regression results to check the 
robustness of results of column (11). The real exchange rate volatility variable  
is positive and significant at 10 percent level. The coefficient of real exchange rate 
volatility  increases from 0.03 (column 11) to 0.13 (column 12). Tax variable 
 is positive and statistically significant at 10 percent; however, it is 
economically insignificant. This again reinforces the view that corporate tax rate in 
host countries does not impact Australia’s equity investment. The size variable  is 
negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The covariance variable 
 is statistically significant at 10 percent level; however, it is economically 
insignificant. The legal origin dummy 
( )VOL
(VOL)
)
)
)
(TAX
(SZ
(COV
( )LO  is economically and statistically 
insignificant. The island dummy ( )ISL  is negative and statistically significant at the 1 
percent level.   
 
Overall, results of Table 3 suggest that real exchange rate volatility has a significant 
effect on Australia’s equity home bias. The point estimates and significance of real 
exchange rate volatility for generalised method of moments robustness tests increase as 
compared to using non-instrumented variables, reinforcing that real exchange rate 
volatility has a significant effect on Australia’s equity home bias.  
[TABLE 4] 
Table 4 indicates the panel regression results and generalised method of moments 
regression test results of Australia’s home bias measure by regressing home bias 
variable against the independent variables, i.e., real exchange rate volatility, island 
dummy, covariance, size, foreign listing, trade and distance.  
 
In column (1), real exchange rate volatility variable ( )VOL  is positive but insignificant. 
The trade variable ( )TRD  is negative and significant at 1 percent. However,  is 
economically insignificant. Mishra and Daly (2006) state that the major determinants 
of Australia’s geographical allocation of portfolio investment indicates a broad 
correspondence between stock market capitalisation of destination countries and the 
allocation of Australian financial investments but with some deviations from that 
baseline, where the deviations are correlated with Australian trade patterns. The size 
variable  enters significantly at the 1 percent level with a negative sign. 
Covariance variable (  is positive and significant at 5 percent. Covariance 
variable is used to test the diversification motive. Covariance variable, though 
statistically significant, is economically insignificant suggesting low diversification 
motives of investors. The island dummy 
TRD
(SZ )
)COV
( )ISL is negative and significant at 1 percent. 
The overall adjusted R2 is 0.33.  
 
Column (2) presents generalized method of moments regression results to check the 
robustness of results in column (1). Real exchange rate volatility (  enters 
significantly at 5 percent with a positive sign. The coefficient of real exchange rate 
volatility increases from 0.01 (using the non-instrumented variable) to 0.20 (using 
)VOL
 19
instrumented variable). The trade variable ( )TRD  changes sign from negative (column 
1) to positive (column 2). Size variable ( )SZ  is negative and significant at 1 percent. 
Covariance variable (  is both economically and statistically insignificant, 
suggesting low diversification motives of investors. The island dummy is negative and 
significant at 1 percent.  
)COV
 
Column (3) presents regression results by employing tax variable ( )TAX  along with 
real exchange rate volatility ( , island dummy )VOL ( )ISL , covariance ( , size 
 and trade  independent variables. Real exchange rate volatility ( )  is 
positive and insignificant. Tax variable 
)
) )
COV
(SZ (TRD VOL
( )TAX  is positive and insignificant implying 
that corporate tax rate in destination countries does not impact Australia’s equity 
investment. The trade variable ( )TRD  is negative and insignificant. This is in 
accordance with Mishra (2008) who states that trade linkages are found to have a 
mixed impact on Australia’s equity home bias. The covariance variable , 
though statistically significant at the 5 percent level, is economically insignificant, 
suggesting low diversification motives of Australian investors. The size variable  
enters significantly at the 1 percent level with a negative sign implying that home bias 
decreases in the relative value of a country’s portfolio. The island dummy retains the 
same sign and significance level as in column (1).  
( )COV
( )SZ
 
Column (4) presents generalized method of moments regression results to check the 
robustness of results of column (3). Real exchange rate volatility ( )VOL  is positive and 
significant at the 5 percent level. The coefficient increases from 0.01 (column 3) to 
0.20 (column 4). Tax variable ( )TAX  is positive and insignificant reinforcing that 
corporate tax rate in destination countries has no major influence in Australia’s equity 
investment. The trade variable ( )TRD  changes sign from negative (column 3) to 
positive (column 4). The trade variable also becomes significant at 1 percent level in 
column (4). The coefficient of trade variable is low (0.01) reinforcing Mishra (2008) 
finding that trade linkages are found to have a mixed impact on Australia’s equity 
home bias. The covariance variable ( )COV  is negative and insignificant supporting 
Mishra (2008) who states that Australian investors have low diversification motives. 
The size variable  enters significantly at the 1 percent level with a negative sign. 
The size variable 
(SZ )
( )SZ  coefficient increases from -0.44 (column 3) to -0.46 (column 
4). This reinforces that home bias decreases as the relative weight of a country’s 
portfolio increases in the world market portfolio. The island dummy  is negative 
and significant at the 1 percent level. 
(ISL)
 
In column (5), real exchange rate volatility variable ( )VOL  is positive but significant at 
10 percent. The foreign listing variable ( )FL  is negative and significant at 1 percent. 
Australian investors prefer the host country’s firms which alleviate information 
asymmetries by publicly listing in the Australian stock exchange. The size variable 
 enters significantly at the 1 percent level with a negative sign. The island dummy 
 is negative and significant at 1 percent. The overall adjusted R2 is 0.44.  
(SZ )
)(ISL
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Column (6) presents generalized method of moments regression results to check the 
robustness of results in column (3). Real exchange rate volatility (  enters 
significantly at 5 percent with a positive sign. The coefficient of real exchange rate 
volatility increases from 0.02 (using the non-instrumented variable) to 0.16 (using 
instrumented variable). The foreign listing variable 
)VOL
( )FL  is negative and significant at 
1 percent. Size variable  is negative and significant at 1 percent. The island 
dummy is negative and significant at 1 percent.  
(SZ )
 
Column (7) presents regression results by employing tax variable ( )TAX  along with 
real exchange rate volatility , island dummy (VOL) ( )ISL , foreign listing (  and size 
 independent variables. Real exchange rate volatility 
)
)
FL
(SZ ( )VOL  is positive and 
significant at the 10 percent level. Tax variable ( )TAX  is positive and insignificant 
implying that corporate tax rate in destination countries does not have a major impact 
on Australia’s equity investment. The foreign listing variable ( )FL  has the same sign 
and significance level as in column (5) reinforcing that Australian investors prefer the 
host country’s firms which alleviate information asymmetries by publicly listing in the 
Australian stock exchange. The size variable ( )SZ  enters significantly at the 1 percent 
level with a negative sign. The island dummy is negative and significant at 1 percent.  
 
Column (8) presents generalized method of moments regression results to check the 
robustness of results in column (7). Real exchange rate volatility (  enters 
significantly at 5 percent with a positive sign. The coefficient of real exchange rate 
volatility increases from 0.02 (using the non-instrumented variable) to 0.14 (using 
instrumented variable). The tax variable 
)VOL
( )TAX  has the same coefficient and 
significance level as in column (7). The foreign listing variable ( )FL  is negative and 
significant at 1 percent. The size variable ( )SZ  is negative and significant at 1 percent. 
The coefficient of size variable (  increases from -0.45 to -0.49.  The island dummy 
is negative and significant at 1 percent.  
)SZ
 
In column (9), real exchange rate volatility variable ( )VOL  is positive and significant 
at 10 percent. The distance variable ( )DIS  is negative and significant at 10 percent. 
The size variable  enters significantly at the 1 percent level with a negative sign. 
The foreign listing variable  is negative and significant at 1 percent. The island 
dummy  is negative and significant at 1 percent. The overall adjusted R2 is 0.45.  
(SZ )
)
)
)
(FL
(ISL
 
Column (10) presents generalized method of moments regression results to check the 
robustness of results in column (5). Real exchange rate volatility (  enters 
significantly at 5 percent with a positive sign. The coefficient of real exchange rate 
volatility increases from 0.02 (using the non-instrumented variable) to 0.16 (using 
instrumented variable). The distance variable 
VOL
( )DIS  is negative and insignificant. 
Australia’s equity investment share is: US (49.22%), UK (7.64%), Netherlands 
(6.03%), Germany (2.83%), Canada (1.77%) and Italy (1.02%). Australia’s distance in 
kilometres from these countries is: US (15945), UK (16984), Netherlands (16631), 
Germany (16072), Canada (15809) and Italy (16211). Australia’s investment share in 
Asia Pacific countries is: New Zealand (0.65%), Japan (0.08%), China (0.39%), Hong 
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Kong (2.55%), India (0.86%), Indonesia (0.12%), Malaysia (0.15%), Singapore 
(0.88%). Australia’s distance in kilometres from these countries is: New Zealand 
(2322), Japan (7925), China (8987), Hong Kong (7276), India (10365), Indonesia 
(5399), Malaysia (6524) and Singapore (6225). Australia’s disproportionate investment 
in some distant countries rather than its investment in nearby countries may be due to 
the lack of development of many financial markets in Asia including China (Mishra 
and Daly (2006)). The foreign listing variable ( )FL  is negative and significant at 1 
percent. Size variable (  is negative and significant at 1 percent. The island dummy 
is negative and significant at 1 percent.  
)SZ
 
Column (11) presents regression results by employing tax variable ( )TAX  along with 
real exchange rate volatility , island dummy (VOL) ( )ISL , foreign listing ( , size 
 and distance 
)
)
FL
(SZ ( )DIS  independent variables. Real exchange rate volatility , 
island dummy  and foreign listing 
( )VOL
(ISL) ( )FL  have the same coefficient, sign and 
significance level as in column (9). The tax variable ( )TAX  is positive and 
insignificant. Size variable  is negative and significant at 1 percent. The distance 
variable  is negative and significant at 10 percent. The island dummy is negative 
and significant at 1 percent.  
(SZ )
)
)
(DIS
 
Column (12) presents generalized method of moments regression results to check the 
robustness of results in column (11). Real exchange rate volatility  enters 
significantly at 5 percent with a positive sign. The coefficient of real exchange rate 
volatility increases from 0.02 (using the non-instrumented variable) to 0.14 (using 
instrumented variable). The tax variable 
(VOL
( )TAX  is positive and insignificant implying 
that corporate tax rate in destination countries does not impact Australia’s equity 
investment. The foreign listing variable ( )FL  and size variable ( )SZ  are negative and 
significant at 1 percent. The distance variable ( )DIS  becomes insignificant reinforcing 
Mishra and Daly’s (2006) finding that Australia disproportionately invests in some 
distant countries rather than in nearby countries. The island dummy is negative and 
significant at 1 percent.  
 
Overall, results of Table 4 suggest that real exchange rate volatility is a potential driver 
of Australia’s equity home bias in presence of various control variables: foreign listing, 
size, trade, distance, covariance and island dummy. The point estimates and 
significance of exchange rate volatility increase in generalised method of moments 
robustness tests as compared to using non-instrumented variable, reinforcing that real 
exchange rate volatility is a potential driver of Australia’s equity home bias.  
[TABLE 5] 
In column (1), real exchange rate volatility variable ( )VOL  is positive but insignificant. 
The transaction cost variable ( )TRAN  is positive and significant at 5 percent. 
However, is economically insignificant. Mishra (2008) states that transaction 
costs do not impact Australia’s equity home bias. The size variable  enters 
significantly at the 1 percent level with a negative sign. The island dummy is 
negative and significant at 1 percent. The overall adjusted R2 is 0.27.  
TRAN (SZ )
( )ISL
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Column (2) presents generalized method of moments regression results to check the 
robustness of results in column (1). Real exchange rate volatility (  enters 
significantly at 5 percent with a positive sign. The coefficient of real exchange rate 
volatility increases from 0.02 (using the non-instrumented variable) to 0.17 (using 
instrumented variable). The transaction cost variable 
)VOL
( )TRAN  is positive; but 
insignificant. Size variable  is negative and significant at 5 percent. The island 
dummy is negative and significant at 1 percent.  
(SZ )
 
In column (3), real exchange rate volatility variable ( )VOL  is positive and significant 
at 10 percent. The foreign listing ( )FL  is negative and significant at 1 percent, 
implying that the greater the share of foreign firms listed in the domestic market, the 
greater the visibility of foreign firms by local investors and the greater the access of 
foreign equities by local investors. The transaction cost variable ( )TRAN  is positive 
and significant at 10 percent. However, TRAN is economically insignificant. The size 
variable  enters significantly at the 1 percent level with a negative sign. The island 
dummy is negative and significant at 1 percent. The overall adjusted R2 is 0.31.  
(SZ )
)
)
(ISL
 
Column (4) presents generalized method of moments regression results to check the 
robustness of results in column (3). Real exchange rate volatility (  enters 
significantly at 5 percent with a positive sign. The coefficient of real exchange rate 
volatility increases from 0.02 (using the non-instrumented variable) to 0.14 (using 
instrumented variable). The foreign listing 
VOL
( )FL  is negative and significant at 10 
percent. The transaction cost variable ( )TRAN  is positive; but insignificant. The island 
dummy is negative and significant at 1 percent.  
 
In column (5), real exchange rate volatility variable ( )VOL  is positive but insignificant. 
The foreign listing ( )FL  is negative and significant at 1 percent. The transaction cost 
variable  is positive but insignificant. The size variable (  enters 
significantly at the 1 percent level with a negative sign. The island dummy is 
negative and significant at 1 percent. The overall adjusted R2 is 0.44.  
(TRAN ) )
)
SZ
( )ISL
 
Column (6) presents generalized method of moments regression results to check the 
robustness of results in column (5). Real exchange rate volatility (  enters 
significantly at 5 percent with a positive sign. The coefficient of real exchange rate 
volatility increases from 0.02 (using the non-instrumented variable) to 0.17 (using 
instrumented variable). The foreign listing 
VOL
( )FL  is negative and significant at 1 
percent. The transaction cost variable ( )TRAN  changes sign from positive (column 5) 
to negative (column 6) and is insignificant. The size variable ( )SZ  enters significantly 
at the 1 percent level with a negative sign. The island dummy ( )ISL  is negative and 
significant at 1 percent.  
 
Overall, results of Table 5 suggest that real exchange rate volatility has a significant 
effect on equity home bias, in presence of various control variables: foreign listing, 
size, transaction cost and island dummy. The point estimates and significance of 
exchange rate volatility increase as compared to using non-instrumented variable, 
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suggesting that real exchange rate volatility plays a critical role in Australia’s equity 
home bias. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
The existing literature on home bias mainly focuses on different motives of investors, 
including explicit barriers to international investment, hedging motives, information 
asymmetries, behavioural biases and corporate governance. The literature related to the 
role of exchange rate volatility as a potential source of equity home bias is sparse. 
There is only one systematic study by Fidora et al. (2007) that focuses on the role of 
real exchange rate volatility as a driver of portfolio home bias and explains the 
differences in home bias across equity and bond. There is no study which focuses on 
the role of exchange rate volatility for single source country. The current paper 
contributes to the literature on exchange rate volatility and home bias by investigating 
the effect of real exchange rate volatility on Australia’s equity home bias by employing 
IMF’s high quality CPIS dataset, over the years 2001 to 2006.  
 
This paper employs a Markowitz type mean variance portfolio model and empirically 
tests the hypothesis that home bias increases in real exchange rate volatility, which 
measures the degree to which relative purchasing power parity is violated. If the 
change in the real exchange rate volatility equals the inflation differential, i.e. relative 
purchasing power parity holds, home bias is zero. Conversely, as real exchange rate 
volatility increases to infinity, home bias converges to unity, which implies an absence 
of foreign investment. 
 
The paper explores the role of exchange rate volatility as a driver of global equity 
home bias, for source and host country fixed effects, in the presence of gravity type 
control variables related to familiarity and diversification. On the empirical front, the 
paper conducts robustness tests (generalised method of moments) by employing 
instrumental variables that are standard in the financial economics literature. Results 
indicate that real exchange rate volatility is a potential driver of Australia’s equity 
home bias. 
 
The results have implications for economic policy. Exchange rate volatility introduces 
a macroeconomic policy dimension into international financial integration and plays an 
important role along with information costs, transaction costs and governance. Real 
exchange rate volatility should be taken into account in formulating financial 
integration, home bias, macroeconomic and monetary stability policy models.  
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Appendix A: Countries  
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Austria 
Hong Kong 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Italy 
Japan 
South Korea 
Malaysia 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Poland 
Singapore 
South Africa 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
UK 
US 
Canada 
Belgium 
Luxembourg 
Austria 
Brazil 
Chile 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Italy 
Japan 
Malaysia 
South Africa 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
UK 
US 
Canada 
Belgium 
Luxembourg 
Austria 
Brazil 
Chile 
Hong Kong 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Italy 
Japan 
South Korea 
Malaysia 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Singapore 
South Africa 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Thailand 
UK 
US 
Canada 
Belgium 
Luxembourg 
Austria 
Chile 
Hong Kong 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Finland 
Germany 
Japan 
South Korea 
Malaysia 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Singapore 
South Africa 
Spain 
Sweden 
Thailand 
UK 
US 
Canada 
Luxembourg 
Austria 
Hong Kong 
Czech Republic 
Finland 
Germany 
Japan 
South Korea 
Malaysia 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Singapore 
UK 
US 
Luxembourg 
Brazil 
Chile 
Hong Kong 
Czech Republic 
Finland 
Germany 
India 
Italy 
Japan 
Malaysia 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Poland 
Singapore 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Canada 
Argentina 
Belgium 
Luxembourg 
 
 
Note: Table includes only those countries for which CPIS data on countries equity 
investment in Australia and Australia’s equity investment in these countries is 
available. 
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Table 1: Australia’s portfolio equity investment (2006) 
 
 
Country 
(1) 
Actual share in 
Australia’s equity 
portfolio 
(2) 
Benchmark 
share in world 
float market 
capitalisation 
(3) 
Actual 
over 
Benchmark
(4) 
ijFFHB ,  
 
 
Argentina 0.002 0.557 0.003 0.996 
Brazil 0.065 0.640 0.102 0.898 
Belgium 0.071 1.076 0.065 0.934 
Chile 0.002 0.103 0.019 0.980 
Canada 0.335 1.418 0.236 0.763 
Czech Republic 0.001 0.076 0.013 0.987 
Finland 0.047 0.526 0.089 0.910 
Germany 0.531 1.884 0.281 0.718 
Hong Kong 0.479 2.563 0.187 0.813 
Italy 0.192 3.859 0.049 0.950 
Japan 1.598 8.978 0.177 0.822 
Luxembourg 0.005 0.025 0.200 0.800 
Malaysia 0.029 0.242 0.119 0.881 
Netherlands 1.136 8.034 0.141 0.859 
Norway 0.073 0.267 0.273 0.727 
Poland 0.0008 0.183 0.0043 0.995 
Singapore 0.165 0.526 0.314 0.686 
UK 1.475 6.351 0.232 0.768 
US 9.471 27.028        0.350 0.650 
 
Source: Foreign equity investments from the IMF’s CPIS. (Author’s own calculation).  
Note: : Float adjusted home bias measure. ijFFHB ,
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix (2001 to 2006) 
 
 
FFHB  VOL  ISL  COV  SIZE
 
LAN LO  TRD  FL  DIS  TRAN
VOL  0.13           
ISL  -0.29 0.03          
COV  0.20 0.09 0.31         
SIZE  -0.45 -0.11 0.20 -0.13        
LAN  -0.30 -0.08 0.32 0.02 0.24       
LO  -0.25 0.05 0.25 0.17 0.31 0.48      
TRD  0.02 -0.09 0.16 0.19 -0.15 0.13 0.46     
FL  -0.36 -0.02 -0.35 -0.56 -0.02 -0.18 -0.14 0.20    
DIS  -0.17 0.04 -0.17 -0.43 0.11 -0.07 -0.47 -0.84 0.18   
TRAN  0.33 0.21 -0.24 0.41 -0.32 -0.03 0.03 0.07 -0.20 -0.19  
TAX  -0.11 0.00 0.05 -0.24 0.32 0.09 -0.19 -0.15 0.05 0.15 -0.47 
 
Note: *,** and *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
White corrected t-statistics in parenthesis. : Float adjusted home bias measure, 
: standard deviation of monthly change of the difference of bilateral nominal 
exchange rate and bilateral inflation differential, 1995 to 2006, dummy which is 
equal to the number of island countries, COV : Covariance of monthly returns between 
source country and destination country, : share of a country’s stock market in 
world market capitalization,   dummy which is equal to 1 if host and source 
country share common language, otherwise it is zero,  dummy which is equal to 1 
if host and source country share common legal origin, otherwise it is zero, TRD : Trade 
is the average of imports and exports normalised by the destination country’s GDP, 
: share of foreign firms listed in the domestic market, : logarithm of distance 
between countries, TRAN : transaction cost associated with share trading in destination 
country, TAX : corporate tax rate of destination country. 
ijFFHB ,
VOL
:ISL
SIZE
:LAN
:LO
FL DIS
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Table 3: Australia’s Home Bias I (2001 to 2006) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VOL  
0.03*** 
(1.69) 
0.18** 
(1.69) 
0.02 
(1.63) 
0.14** 
(2.09) 
0.03*** 
(1.80) 
0.13** 
(2.14) 
0.03*** 
(1.81) 
-0.08 
(-1.04) 
0.03*** 
(1.85) 
0.17** 
(2.19) 
0.03*** 
(1.78) 
0.13***
(1.85) 
ISL  
-0.07* 
(-3.72) 
-0.09* 
(-4.74) 
-0.07* 
(-3.73) 
-0.08* 
(-3.91) 
-0.07* 
(-3.91) 
-0.08* 
(-3.50) 
-0.07* 
(-3.87) 
-0.06** 
(-2.32) 
-0.06* 
(-3.61) 
-0.09* 
(-4.52) 
-0.06* 
(-3.63) 
-0.08* 
(-3.81) 
COV  
0.00* 
(2.68) 
0.00 
(1.48) 
0.00* 
(2.74) 
0.00* 
(2.62) 
0.00* 
(2.84) 
0.00** 
(2.56) 
0.00* 
(2.65) 
0.00* 
(3.01) 
0.00* 
(2.74) 
0.00** 
(2.07) 
0.00* 
(2.76) 
0.00** 
(2.19) 
SIZE  
-0.40* 
(-5.14) 
-0.40* 
(-3.32) 
-0.42* 
(-5.34) 
-0.49* 
(-4.02) 
    -0.35* 
(-4.29) 
-0.19 
(-1.06) 
-0.37* 
(-4.25) 
-0.40** 
(-1.98) 
LAN  
    -0.06* 
(-2.69) 
-0.04 
(-1.35) 
-0.06* 
(-2.70) 
-0.14* 
(-3.57) 
    
LO  
        -0.02*** 
(-1.79) 
-0.03 
(-1.22) 
-0.02 
(-1.52) 
-0.01 
(-0.51) 
TAX  
  0.00 
(1.34) 
0.00** 
(2.01) 
  -0.00 
(-0.29) 
0.00*** 
(1.85) 
  0.00 
(0.72) 
0.00***
(1.67) 
Const. 0.90* 
(18.37) 
0.84* 
(12.24) 
0.86* 
(14.28) 
0.70* 
(8.41) 
0.89* 
(18.37) 
0.82* 
(13.31) 
0.90* 
(15.13) 
0.80* 
(8.34) 
0.89* 
(18.11) 
0.80* 
(12.19) 
0.87* 
(14.71) 
0.70* 
(8.29) 
Adj. R2 0.29  0.30  0.24  0.24  0.31  0.31  
Obs. 137 137 137 137 137  137  137 137 137  
 
Note: *,** and *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
White corrected t-statistics in parenthesis. VOL: standard deviation of monthly change 
of the difference of bilateral nominal exchange rate and bilateral inflation differential, 
1995 to 2006,  dummy which is equal to the number of island countries, : 
Covariance of monthly returns between source country and destination country, : 
share of a country’s stock market in world market capitalization,  dummy which 
is equal to 1 if host and source country share common language, otherwise it is zero, 
 dummy which is equal to 1 if host and source country share common legal origin, 
otherwise it is zero, TAX : corporate tax rate from KPMG’s corporate tax rate survey. 
:ISL COV
SIZE
:LAN
:LO
Instrumental variables:- : dummy which is equal to the number of landlocked 
countries, 
LCK
REL : Index of religion from Alesina et al (2002), : logarithm of 
distance in kilometre between capitals of host and source countries, : Logarithm 
of gross domestic product, : product of the natural logarithm of population of 
host and source countries, 
DIS
GDP
POP
ETH : Ethnicity index, lagVOL: lag value of volatility, 
Kaufmann et al (2006) governance indicators:-VACC : voice and accountability, RL : 
Rule of law, : Regulatory quality, GE : government effectiveness, CC :control of 
corruption. 
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Table 4: Australia’s Home Bias II (2001 to 2006) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VOL  
0.01 
(1.19) 
0.20** 
(2.39) 
0.01 
(1.16) 
0.20** 
(2.30) 
0.02*** 
(1.76) 
0.16** 
(2.34) 
0.02*** 
(1.68) 
0.14** 
(2.06) 
0.02*** 
(1.73) 
0.16** 
(2.33) 
0.02*** 
(1.64) 
0.14** 
(2.12) 
ISL  
-0.08* 
(-3.82) 
-0.11* 
(-6.65) 
-0.08* 
(-3.77) 
-0.11* 
(-6.79) 
-0.08* 
(-5.49) 
-0.08* 
(-4.00) 
-0.08* 
(-5.45) 
-0.08* 
(-3.81) 
-0.09* 
(-5.57) 
-0.08* 
(-3.98) 
-0.09* 
(-5.53) 
-0.08* 
(-3.88) 
COV  
0.00** 
(2.01) 
-0.00 
(-0.78) 
0.00** 
(2.07) 
-0.00 
(-0.45) 
        
FL  
    -0.27* 
(-6.11) 
-0.18* 
(-2.77) 
-0.27* 
(-6.11) 
-0.18* 
(-2.75) 
-0.26* 
(-5.81) 
-0.18* 
(-2.72) 
-0.26* 
(-5.84) 
-0.17* 
(-2.71) 
SIZE  
-0.42* 
(-5.35) 
-0.40* 
(-2.81) 
-0.44* 
(-5.42) 
-0.46* 
(-2.91) 
-0.43* 
(-5.44) 
-0.42* 
(-3.90) 
-0.45* 
(-5.43) 
-0.49* 
(-4.02) 
-0.41* 
(-5.21) 
-0.42* 
(-3.69) 
-0.44* 
(-5.32) 
-0.50* 
(-4.18) 
TRD  
-0.00* 
(-0.01) 
0.01* 
(4.38) 
-0.00 
(-0.13) 
0.01* 
(4.04) 
        
DIS  
        -0.06*** 
(-1.90) 
-0.00 
(-0.20) 
-0.07** 
(-2.09) 
-0.00 
(-1.05) 
TAX  
  0.00 
(0.86) 
0.00 
(0.91) 
  0.00 
(1.23) 
0.00 
(1.01) 
  0.00 
(1.49) 
0.00 
(1.48) 
Const. 0.94* 
(21.30) 
0.94* 
(13.80) 
0.92* 
(18.06) 
0.87* 
(9.74) 
1.03* 
(35.05) 
0.91* 
(11.07) 
1.00* 
(30.30) 
0.87* 
(10.19) 
1.30* 
(8.78) 
0.94* 
(5.32) 
1.29* 
(9.10) 
1.04* 
(5.73) 
Adj. 
R2 
0.33  0.33  0.44  0.44  0.45  0.46  
Obs. 137 137 137  137 137 137 137 137  137  
 
Note: *,** and *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
White corrected t-statistics in parenthesis. VOL: standard deviation of monthly change 
of the difference of bilateral nominal exchange rate and bilateral inflation differential, 
1995 to 2006,  dummy which is equal to the number of island countries, : 
Covariance of monthly returns between source country and destination country, : 
share of foreign firms listed in the domestic market, : share of a country’s stock 
market in world market capitalization, TRD : Trade is the average of imports and 
exports normalised by the destination country’s GDP, TAX : corporate tax rate from 
KPMG’s corporate tax rate survey. 
:ISL COV
FL
SIZE
Instrumental variables:- : dummy which is equal to the number of landlocked 
countries, 
LCK
REL : Index of religion from Alesina et al (2002), : logarithm of 
distance in kilometre between capitals of host and source countries, : Logarithm 
of gross domestic product, : product of the natural logarithm of population of 
host and source countries, 
DIS
GDP
POP
ETH : Ethnicity index, lagVOL: lag value of volatility, 
Kaufmann et al (2006) governance indicators:-VACC : voice and accountability, RL : 
Rule of law, : Regulatory quality, GE : government effectiveness, CC :control of 
corruption. 
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Table 5: Australia’s Home Bias III (2001 to 2006) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VOL  
0.02 
(0.98) 
0.17** 
(2.38) 
0.02*** 
(1.71) 
0.14** 
(2.14) 
0.02 
(1.59) 
0.17** 
(2.30) 
ISL  
-0.04** 
(-2.01) 
-0.07* 
(-4.05) 
-0.09* 
(-5.53) 
-0.08* 
(-3.80) 
-0.08* 
(-5.23) 
-0.09* 
(-4.14) 
FL  
  -0.25* 
(-5.25) 
-0.13*** 
(-1.95) 
-0.26* 
(-5.64) 
-0.19** 
(-2.58) 
SIZE  
-0.40* 
(-4.96) 
-0.30** 
(-2.23) 
  -0.42* 
(-5.07) 
-0.46* 
(-3.44) 
TRAN  
0.00** 
(2.13) 
0.00 
(1.35) 
0.00*** 
(1.79) 
0.00 
(0.85) 
0.00 
(0.26) 
-0.00 
(-0.68) 
Const. 0.94* 
(21.30) 
0.94* 
(13.80) 
0.99* 
(24.08) 
0.88* 
(10.36) 
1.30* 
(8.78) 
0.92* 
(10.64) 
Adj. R2 0.27  0.31  0.44  
Obs. 137 137 137 137 137  
 
Note: *,** and *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
White corrected t-statistics in parenthesis. VOL: standard deviation of monthly change 
of the difference of bilateral nominal exchange rate and bilateral inflation differential, 
1995 to 2006,  dummy which is equal to the number of island countries, : 
share of foreign firms listed in the domestic market, : share of a country’s stock 
market in world market capitalization, TRAN : transaction cost associated with share 
trading in destination country.  
:ISL FL
SIZE
Instrumental variables:- : dummy which is equal to the number of landlocked 
countries, 
LCK
REL : Index of religion from Alesina et al (2002), : logarithm of 
distance in kilometre between capitals of host and source countries, : Logarithm 
of gross domestic product, : product of the natural logarithm of population of 
host and source countries, 
DIS
GDP
POP
ETH : Ethnicity index, lagVOL: lag value of volatility, 
Kaufmann et al (2006) governance indicators:-VACC : voice and accountability, RL : 
Rule of law, : Regulatory quality, GE : government effectiveness, CC :control of 
corruption. 
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Graph 1: Australia’s Home Bias (2002 to 2006) 
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